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AMERICAN WATER RIGHTS LAW:
A Brief Synopsis of Its Origin and Some of Its Broad Trends with
Special Reference to the Beneficial Use of Water Resourcest
C. E. BUSBY*
Water problems arise out of too little or too much water. Too
little water results from drought, rapid or over development, lack
of storage or replenishment, and impairment in water quality by sediment, industrial and human wastes, and by salt encroachment. Too
much water results from excessive precipitation and runoff, poor
land use practices, and barriers to its movement over and through
the land. Water may be an asset or a liability depending upon how
it is used and managed. It has seldom been in exactly the right
amount, at the right time, and in the right place. 1
After it falls upon the land, water is retarded or accelerated in its
movements by land use and water management practices and structures. This affects its availability for use and its capacity to cause
damage. Much of this management situation is in the hands of farmers and ranchers of the nation but part is in the hands of non-agricultural groups. Severe erosion, sedimentation and water management problems arising out of improper land use have given rise to
one of the most important movements and legal devices for group
&2
action in conservation ever to be experienced by agricultural peoples.
This democratic and thoroughly American approach to the solution
of local problems might prove useful in other spheres of activity.
Often the upstream portion of drainage areas or basins is dominated
by one combination of water supply and damage conditions while
the downstream portion is dominated by another. Seasonal changes
alter this situation somewhat. Thus, for centuries there have been
sharp conflicts among land and water users, states and nations owing
to the fact that the source of water and the damage caused by it
OMember of District of Columbia Bar; Conservationist, Soil Conservation Service, Berkeley, California; Consultant to the South Carolina Soil Conservation Committee; A.B.,
M.Sc., University of Nebraska; LL.B., Georgetown University.
t hs article does not necessarily represent the views of the U. S. Department of Agriculture.
1. BENNETT, H. H., WATER IN TiHE GROUND: Too MUCH OR TOO LITTLE
WATER. Soil Conservation, vol. XVI, pp. 153-157. February, 1951.

2. SOIL CONSERVATION DIsTRIcTs. (Mimeographed report by U. S. Soil ConNote: This report shows more than
servation Service released July, 1952.)
2,400 districts organized in 48 states, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Hawaii,
and Alaska, including 84 per cent of the farms in the United States.
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often arise in different localities and jurisdictions from the place
where water is used and the damage takes place.3 The resolving of
these conflicts among water users and governments has presented
monumental tasks for engineers, lawyers and statesmen in many parts
4
of the world.
Different systems of custom and law affecting the use and management of water seem to have arisen out of these basic physical and
human relationships. In our 17 western States, which are generally
considered a shortage region but have also conditions of excess water,
a system of prior appropriation has emerged. This emphasizes exclusive rights of use for specific quantities, times and places, subject
to the rule of reasonable beneficial use but not depending upon ownership of land contiguous to the water supply.5 -6 Here there is nearly
7
uniform state-wide administration of water development and use,
8
since ordinary processes of law are inadequate and entire sources of
supply are considered. 9 But of course this system is supperimposed
upon a residual one of the modified common law in the Pacific Coast
and Great Plains states, especially in California where it is still very
important.' 0
In the eastern 31 States, however, which are generally considered
a water excess region but have also conditions of shortage, a system
of the modified common law of water rights obtains. This emphasizes
rights of water use in common without regard to specific quantities,
times and places of use, subject to the rule of reasonable use, but
depending in the first instance upon ownership of land contiguous to
the water supply." Here there is a lack of state-wide administra3. WiEL, S. C., FIFTY YEAs OF WATER LAw, 50 HAR. L. RPv., 252, 254, 267
(1916); NEWELL ox IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT (1916); REPORT, PRESERVATION
OP THE INTEGRITY OF STATE WATER LAWS, NAT. REcL. Assoc., Appendix G,

pp. 165-168 (1943); U. S. v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U. S. 725, 746-747
(1949).

4. See, for example, report on the Colorado Basin, House Document 717,
80th Congress, 2d Session, 1948.
5. HuTcHINs, WELLS A., SELECTED PROBLE1,1S IN THE LAW OF WATER RIGHTS
IN THE WEST, pp. 80-107 (1942).
6. REPORT, PRESIDENT'S WATER POLICY COMMISsION, WATER RESOURCEs LAW,
vol. III, pp. 154-167 (1950) with footnotes thereto and including particularly
Appendix B by Wells A. Hutchins.
7. Hutchins, op. cit. (footnote 5), p. 77.
8. Report, op. cit. (footnote 6), p. 158.
9. Rasmussen v. Moreni Irr. Co., 56 Utah 140, 153, 189 Pac. 572 (1920);
Richlands Irr. Co. v. Westview Irr. Co., 96 Utah 403, 418, 80 Pac. (2d) 458
(1938) ; Hutchins, op. cit. (footnote 5), pp. 128-129. See also infra, cases cited
under footnote 62.
10. Hutchins, op. cit. (footnote 5), pp. 42-64; U. S. v. Gerlach Live Stock
Co., supra; Report, op. cit. (footnote 6), p. 156 with footnote.
11. Heath v. Williams, 43 Am. Dec. 265, 270-276 (1845); and cases therein
cited; Shively v. Bowvlby, 152 U. S. 1, 14-15 (1894) and cases therein cited.
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tion of water development and use in the comprehensive sense in
which it is carried out in the West. But there is present in some
states a limited appropriation and administrative system imposed upon
the modified common law. 12 Each of these systems of custom and
law recognizes water rights acquired by adverse use.18
In several states, the civil law rule of diffused surface waters is
in effect while in others the common law rule applies. 14 But in the
West, the unrestricted use of diffused surface waters by the landowner may be limited because these waters constitute one source of
stream flow to which other rights attach. 15
The main differences in the riparian and prior appropriation systems, aside from the extent of development of the rules of law applying to specific circumstances, (and there are differences in this regard
too), are the greater emphasis which the system of prior appropriation places upon the beneficial use of water, the exercise of statewide administration of rights and development, and protection for and
encouragement of investments dependent upon water resources.1 6
Here is where practical problems of policy arise having effect upon
the development, use, conservation and protection of land and water
resources.
It has been said that "moderating principles of correlative rights
and reasonable use seem to be outstripping exclusive rights by priority of appropriation in general esteem" 17 but, in the West, this view
is not borne out in respect of rights as the recorded decisions and
statutes show a steady trend toward restricting the application of
the common-law doctrines. In fact, the rule of reasonable use seems
to be employed as one method for accomplishing such a restrictive
policy.18 In a very broad sense, it appears that as our economy expands and demands for water tend to outstrip the available supply,
the policy of the law of water rights tends to move more and more
toward principles of exclusive use in the western States, the exclu12. McGuiNEss, C. L., WAMR LAW WITH SPECIAL RMREENCE TO GROUND
WATt. U. S. G. S. Cir. 117, pp. 17-30 (1951) ; Report, op. cit. (footnote 6).
13. 56 Am. JUR. 323-339; Hutchins, op. cit. (footnote 5), p. 397.
14. Levene v. Salem, 191 Oreg. 182, 191-192, 229 Pac. (2d) 255 (1951);

56 Am.

JUR.

550.

15. Hutchins, op. cit. (footnote 5), p. 127.
16. Report to the Governor of Kansas, THE APPROPRIATION OF WATER FOR

BENEFICIAL PURPOSPS, p. 19 et seq., December, 1944; Hutchins, op. cit. (footnote 5, pp. 42, 72-77, 298-313, 326-336.
17. Wiel, op. cit. (footnote 3), p. 252.
18. Hutchins, op. cit. (footnote 5), pp. 42, 116; CALIF. CONST., Art. XIV,
Sec. 3; U. S. v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., supra; Report, op. cit. (footnote 6),
App. B,note especially summary for Oregon and Kansas; Bristor v. Cheattam,
Ariz .........
,240 Pac. (2d) 185 (1952). See also Report, State Water Law
........
in the Development of the West, Nat. Rec. Plan Bd., p. 9 (1943).
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sive use to be a reasonable, beneficial use.
Our common-law system of water rights seems to have had its
inception in a simple economy of natural water uses in continental
Europe where the supply of water was generally in excess of requirements.' 9 But our prior appropriation system has had its inception in a more complex economy of artificial uses in the West.2 0 The
experience in the West may prove useful in pointing the way for
adjustments in the policy of the law in other areas. If so, it may
be of interest to consider the manner in which the two American
systems originated and what they mean to our expanding economy in
which water is playing and may be expected to continue to play such
a vital if not dominating role. 2 '
ORIGIN OF THE AmERICAN COMmON LAW SYSTEm

OF WATER RIGHTS

The English common law was in effect in the original thirteen
colonies as the rule of decision before the Revolution 2 2 But it is
doubtful if the original adoption of such a vast body of legal principles was made with conscious regard of an English system of water
rights for there appears to have been none at that early date.23 As
late as 1929, the Supreme Court of Hawaii declined to follow the
so-called English common law on ground waters for these very
reasons.2 4 It has also been held as a general principle that the
common law developed in England after the American Revolution
is not part of the common law which is to be applied in the courts of
the States.25 In view of these circumstances the question arises as
19. WIai,, S. C.,

ORIGIN AND

COMPARATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
6 CALIF. L.

WATERCOURSES IN THE COmmON LAW AND CiviL LAW.
(1918); U. S. v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., supra.

LAW OV
Rrv. 245

20. Hutchins, op. cit. (footnote 5), pp. 66-67; Report, op. cit. (footnote 16).
21. Note: Much of this article is based upon the thorough and very scholar-

ly treatment of the subject of water rights by two American authorities, Samuel
C. Wiel and Wells A. Hutchins. Mr. Hutchins indicates that Mr. Wiel was
a master of the French language and thus was able to go directly to the original sources used by Story and Kent, as hereafter referred to. The very able
contributions of these two American authorities are gratefully acknowledged.
22. 12 C. J. 184-186 and cases there cited.
23. WIE, S. C., WATER RIGHTS, 3d ed., ch. 28, 29; Wiel, op. cit. (footnote
19), p. 246. See also 24 MINN. L. REv.891 (1940) in respect of the "common
enemy" rule and the English common law.
24. HuTcHINs, WELLS A., THE HAWAIIAN SYSTEM OV WATER RIGHTS, p. 97
(1946) ; City Mill Co. v. Honolulu Sewer & Water Comm., 30 Haw. 912, 938943 (1929) and cases therein cited. See Acton v. Blundell, infra. (footnote 32),
p. 1234-"No case has been cited on either side bearing directly on the subject in dispute." See also 3 KENT CoM. 440, footnote c (12th ed.).
25. 12 C. J. 192; 15 C. J. S. 623; see also Mr. justice Story in Van Ness v.
Pacard, 2 Pet. 137, 143, 144, 7 L. Ed. 374-"The common law of England is
not to be taken, in all respects, to be that of America. Our ancestors brought
with them the general principles, and claimed it as their birthright; but they
brought with them and adopted only that portion which was applicable to their
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to what principles of water law existed in England prior to and after
the Revolution in America, the extent to which these were recognized
and enforced by the courts, if at all, and how a system became established there which had influence in America.
INrLUENC4 OV EARLY ENGLISi

AuTHoRITIEs: THE YEAR BooKs,

LORD COKE, AND BLACKSTONE
We are told that the Year Books reflect no system of water-rights
law in England but that they did recognize established customary or
adverse uses in streams, not as rule of property law but rather as
recognized forms of pleading. The assize of nuisance, and later,
trespass on the case seem to have been recognized forms of action
for wrongful diversion of a stream from one who had long enjoyed
its use.2 0-2 7 However, little seems to have been said about ground
water.
These early beginnings of water law seem to be similar in a general
way with respect to the development of custom to those which took
place in California and other parts of the Southwest.2 8 The natural
outgrowth of such an approach, if it had continued and received final
sanction of the courts, might have been the establishment of a system of water law adapted to the early industrial conditions of England where artificial uses were then being made in a limited way.
Whereas use for mining and irrigation seems to have been the impetus
for the development of water customs in California and the Southwest,.9 use for mills and the watering of meadows seems to have
been the impetus in England.3 0 However, the beginnings of customs
in England did not appear to have reached the stage where they
were given final sanction of the courts and legislature such as took
place in our western States.31

situation." Note: No attempt is here made to consider the full application
of these and related authorities to the field of water rights or the effect of
constitutional, statutory, and judicial adoption of the English common law after
the American Revolution.
26. Wiel, op. cit. (footnote 23).
27. Wimr,, S. C., WATERS: AMERICAN LAW AND FRENcH AUTHORITY, 33
HAR. L. R~v., 133, 141 with citations and references there noted.
28. Hutchins, op. cit. (footnote 5), p. 67; Wiel, op. cit. (footnote 23), p. 68.
29. Hutchins, op. cit. (footnote 5), p. 67; RicKETrTs, A. H., AMERICAN MINING LAw, pp. xxii-xxiii (1931 ed.).
30. 2 BLXS. Com. 403; WOOLRYCH ON WATERS, p. 177; 9 S. C. 294 (1837);
13 S. C. 63 (1845); Heath v. Williams, supra; Wiel, op. cit. (footnote 27),
p. 141.
31. Note: The courts in Mason v. Hill, 5 Barn. & Adol. 1, 110 Eng. Rep. 692
(1833), Wood v. Waud, 3 Exch. 748, 154 Eng. Rep. 1047 (1849), and Omelvany v. Jaggers, 2 Hill. 634, 9 S. C. 294 (1837) treated Blackstone as dicta.
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We are told that Lord Coke did not erect a system of water law
though he did include water with land under the adopted maxim
"Cujus est solum ejus usque ad collum et ad inferos." This appears
to have led toward decisions which did affect ground-water law in
England and later in America but which, in some respects, seem to
have been unfortunate when considered from the standpoint of sound
development and conservation.3 2 Lord Coke's thinking may be
excusable, however, because the behavior of surface water has always
been more readily understood than that of ground water. The latter
often has been thought of as quite mysterious when in fact it is not.
The main problem has been the lack of reliable information concerning the occurrence and behavior of ground waters. Engineers,
geologists and others have severely criticized principles of ground33
water law based upon the type of thinking expressed by Lord Coke.
His influence does not seem to have extended very far into the
34
surface-water field, though he was cited in the early cases.
The recognition of customary uses of streams in England seems to
have influenced Blackstone, though he may also have been influenced
by the Roman law.35 From recognition of long established uses, he
appears to have attempted to erect a system of water rights for watercourses but it was not given final acceptance as such. 36 He outlined,
among others, two broad principles. The first was based upon long
continued use of and access to a stream. In this respect it was not
far removed from the riparian principles later adopted in England
but he did not emphasize use in common nor ownership of lands
In contrast the courts of the West and the Congress of the United States
recognized the customs of the miners and sanctioned them as law. See Hutchins, op. cit. (footnote 5), pp. 67-73; Ricketts, op. cit. (footnote 29), pp. xxiv,
XXV.

32. Wiel, op. cit. (footnote 19), p. 246; Wiel, op. cit. (footnote 27), pp.
141-143 with footnotes thereto; Acton v. Blundell, 12 M. & V. 324, 354, 152
Eng. Rep. 1223, 1228, 1233, 1235 (1843) with references particularly to Blackstone and Story.
33. THompsoN, D. G. AND FIELDER, A. G., SoME PRoBLEtms RELATING TO
LEGAL CONTROL OF UsE op GROUND WATRaS, YOUR. AmI. WATER WORKS Assoc.,
vol. 30, No. 7, July, 1938; TOLMAN, C. F. AND STIPP, Aiy C., ANALYSIS
OF LEGAL CONCEPTS OF SUBFLOW AND PERCOLATING WATRRS, TRANs. Am. Soc.

CIvIL ENG., vol. 67, No. 8, Part 2, October, 1941; THrOMAS, HAROLD E., THE
CONSERVATION OF GROUND VATER, pp. 243-267, 1951, New York, Toronto and
London.

34. See, for example, Shury v. Pigot, 3 Bulst 339, 81 Eng. Rep. 1163 (1625).
35. Shury v. Pigot, supra; 2 BLKS. Com. 403 with footnote No. 7 thereto;
Wiel, op. cit. (footnote 27), p. 143. See also Report to Governor of Kansas,
op. cit. (footnote 16), p. 21.

36. 2 BLKs. Com. 403; 3 BLIKs. Com. 218; Wiel, op. cit. (footnote 19), p. 246.
Note: Blackstone was born in 1723 and died in 1780. Most of his legal work
was done after 1746 when he was admitted to the Bar. Some American colonies
adopted the English common law before Blackstone was born- South Carolina
in 1712, State v. Charleston Bridge Co., 113 S. C. 116, 125, 126, 101 S. E. 657
(1919).
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contiguous to the stream as prerequisite to its use.8 7 In fact, he could
not very well do so because his second principle, being based upon
priority of occupation on the stream, constituted a limitation upon
the first principle and was diametrically opposite to the concept of
use in common.3 8 It appears that Blackstone attempted to move beyond recognition of procedural rights to those of substantive rights
of property in waters which counsel in some of the cases had indicated were implied from those procedural rights, and which later
courts, in looking back, seemed to consider as if there had been substantive rights.3 9 The second principle seems to have been tentatively
accepted by the courts as the doctrine of prior occupancy of those
times and was held to be the law of England as late as 1831.40 These
principles were followed to some extent in America but there was a
wavering away from them at an early date.4 1 In view of our extensive Western experience in which the policy of the law seems to be
moving steadily toward the views expressed by Blackstone, it appears
that he was a hundred or more years ahead of his contemporaries in
this field. However, his influence does not seem to have extended to
ground waters, possibly because there appears not to have been many
cases during his time that raised fundamental issues concerning
ground waters.
Although Blackstone's thinking was adopted in some early American decisions, some courts, notably New Jersey, began to veer away
from his concept of exclusive rights by reason of prior occupancy
toward the riparian theory of rights in common. One early New
Jersey case used Latin words much the same as those later used in
connection with the statement of the riparian principles but did not
42
use the word riparian.
And then came the American and French revolutionary movements with special emphasis upon the rights of man.
37. 3 BLKS. CoM. 218-"it is a nuisance to stop or direct water that uses
to run to another's meadow (6) or mill (k) ; to corrupt or poison a watercourse
*,* * in the upper part of the stream (1) * * *

"

See also Haymes v. Gault,

1 McCoRD. 543, 545 (1822).
38. 2 BLXas. Cort. 403 - "If a stream be unoccupied, I may erect a mill thereon, and detain the water; yet not so as to injure my neighbor's mill, or his
meadow; for he hath by the first occupancy acquired a property in the current."
39. Acton v. Blundell, supra; GRAY, CASES ON PROPERTY, Vol. II, 2d ed.,
pp. 81-82, concerning Shury v. Pigot and particularly footnote 1, p. 82 concerning Shotwell v. Dodge, 8 Wash. 337, 339-340 (1894).
40. Liggins v. Inge, 7 Bing. 682, 893, 131 Eng. Rep. 263 (1831) ; Wiel, op. cit.
(footnote 27), p. 133.
41. Wiel, op. cit. (footnote 27), p. 140 with footnotes. See also Haymes v.

Gault, supra.

42. Merrit v. Parker, 1 Coxe (N. J.) 460, 463 (1795) ; Wiel, op. cit. (footnote 27), p. 140 with footnote and p. 146 with footnote.
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INFLUENCE OP THE AmERICAN AND FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY
MOVVEMNTS

Blackstone died in 1780. In 1804 the Code Napoleon was promulgated in France. In 1812, it was adopted in the State of Louisiana.43 The Revolution in America and its aftermath took place
during this general period. The French helped the American colonies gain their independence. Feelings were running very high in
favor of the philosophy of the natural rights of man and the concept
of equality. Feelings in the new states and nation were running
equally high against England and everything English. In some states,
such as New Jersey, Kentucky and New Hampshire, authorities went
44
so far as to refuse to permit English decisions to be relied upon.
This turning away from English guidance to that of France seems
to have been one of the most significant factors in the trend of surfacewater law. But it did not extend to ground-water law. And in fact
the turning away did not last many years, insofar as the law was
concerned, for the key decisions of the English courts, subsequently
cited in American courts, were taken between 1830 and 1850.
INFLUNCE OF THE EARLY AmERICAN AUTHORITIES:
STORY AND KENT

It was in the midst of this period of political adjustment, with all
its emotional overtones, that the English common law of waters was
established and also the strict French riparian law as set forth in
the Code Napoleon. Some American courts had looked to the civil
law for illustration and explanation but most of them did not seem
to draw upon this source for decision until Story and Kent appeared
on the scene with their new ideas gleaned from France and Rome,
and until the Code Napoleon was adopted in Louisiana. It has been
said that the early judges could not use French, so could not go
directly to French civil law. 45 But under the influence of these two
eminent American jurists, who happened to be masters of the French
language, and through them and the English decisions based upon
their thinking, a considerable number of American courts are said
to have adopted the main principles of the French civil law of water43. Wiel, op. cit. (footnote 27), p. 134.
44. Viel, op. cit. (footnote 27), p. 134; GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES OF TE
LAW, 323; POUND, 3 ILL. L. REV. 354, 357-359 with footnotes; MEMOIRS OF
CHANCELLOR KENT, 117-118; PAINE, THOMAS, RIGHTS OF MAN; FEDERALIST
PAPERS, No. 10 (Madison), pp. 58-59.
45. Orleans Navigation Co. v. New Orleans, 2 Martin (O.S.) 214 (1812);
Fable v. Brown, 2 HILL EQ. 378 (1835); Wiel, op. cit. (footnote 19), pp.
249-252; 3 I,. L. Rxv. 354.
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courses and diffused surface waters.4 6 Here is where the concept
of equality of right among riparian proprietors, modified by the rule
of reasonable use seems to have been introduced into English and
American water law. Here is where the concept of the right of the
upper landowner to have his drainage waters flow unobstructed onto
the lower tenement seems to have become adopted.47
Until 1827, no American decision or treatise appears to have used
the word riparian, though as indicated previously the New Jersey
courts had used language peculiar to riparian law and the Code
Napoleon had been adopted in Louisiana at earlier dates. Story used
the word riparian for the first time in Tyler v. Wilkinson and spelled
out there the rights of riparian proprietors, both individually and
collectively. His expressions regarding their collective rights, above
those of prescriptive or other right holders, is interesting when considered with respect to the concept of the "negative community"
which underlies our entire system of the law of watercourses, except
as modified by constitutional provisions and statutory declarations
48
of public policy.
Kent's statements on the riparian doctrine came in 1828.49 His
most recent decision prior to that date did not contain reference to
the word "riparian" or the riparian concept as such.50 Angell, who
published his second edition in 1833, attributed first use of the word
to Story. But we do not know exactly where Story got it or some
of his ideas concerning the doctrine. However, we are sure regarding the origin of Kent's words and ideas for his works are replete
with material and citations from the Code Napoleon, the Institutes
of Justinian, the works of Pothier, and others. We also have his
reasons for adopting and modifying these authorities. 5 1 He seems
46. 56 Am. Jun. 550; 67 C. J. 864-866; Wiel, op. cit. (footnote 19), pp. 249-

250; Wiel, op. cit. (footnote 27), p. 135;

POUND,

3

ILL

L. REv. 354, 360 with

footnotes; Hutchins, op. cit. (footnote 5), p. 30; 24 ILL. L. REv. 896-897 (1940).
47. Orleans Navigation Co. v. New Orleans, supra; 3 KENT Com. 353, 355
(1828); Overton v. Sawyer, 46 N. C. 308 (1854); Kauffman v. Griesener,
26 Pa. St. 407, 413 (1856) ; Butler v. Peck, 16 Ohio St. 334 (1865) ; Gillham v.
Madison R. Co., 49 Ill. 484, 486-487 (1869) ; Ogburn v. Conner, 46 Calif. 346,

351-352 (1873); Omelvany v. Jaggers, supra; White v. Whitney Mfg. Co.,
60 S. C. 254, 265, 266, 38 S. E. 456 (1901); Wiel, op. cit. (footnote 27),
p. 138; Wiel, op. cit. (footnote 19), p. 252; Pound, op. cit. (footnote 46).
48. Tyler v. Wilkinson, 4 Mason 397, Fed. Case No. 14, 312 (1827) ; 3 KEXT
Com. 439 (1828) ; Wiel, op. cit. (footnote 23) including ch. 41; Wiel, op. cit.
(footnote 19), p. 254; Hutchins, op. cit. (footnote 5), pp. 27-29. Statutory
declarations of public policy relate to declarations that the waters of a state
are public property and belong to the people of the state, as in several western

States.
49. 3 KENT Com. 353, 355 (1828).
50. Van Bergens v. Van Bergens, 3 Johns Ch. (N. Y.) 282 (1818); Wiel,
op. cit. (footnote 27), p. 140.
51. 3 KENT Com. 353, et seq.; Wiel, op. cit. (footnote 27), p. 136.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1952

9

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 5 [1952], Art. 6
AmrmicAN WATim RiGHTS LAW

to have drawn upon most of the civil law sources then available to
him. In this connection it should be noted in passing that his adoption of the broad principles of the Roman law may be as important
as those of the French law. Kent seems to have been in the forefront of this movement to use civil law principles. It seems unfortunate that his concepts or those of Blackstone were not given more
consideration in respect of ground water during this formative
2
period
It appears that Kent was more influential of the two great jurists
in the field of American water law because of his full consideration
of French and Roman principles; and because of the fact that his
summation of civil law principles, as he had adapted them to conditions then existing, has been quoted with approval by American and
English courts when establishing definitive statements of the law.53
But there is no aspect of Kent's thinking which should be noted
further. In applying the principle of reasonable use as a limitation
on the strict French riparian law of the Code Napoleon, he emphasized that this was necessary to aid in making beneficial use of
streams. This certainly was a step in the right direction from the
standpoint of beneficial use of the natural flow. But he does not
appear to have recognized the monopoly aspects of the doctrine as
he modified it in respect of the surplus flow above the normal requirements of riparian proprietors. The principles of the Code Napoleon had tended to give downstream proprietors a monopoly of the
natural flow, thus limiting the use of the stream in the upper reaches
of a watershed. Story seems to have recognized a collective monopoly in the hands of all riparian proprietors on a stream because he
indicates that all waters not belonging to prescriptive or other holders
belong to riparian proprietors. In any event, either concept, Story's
or Kent's, tends to hold the surplus stream flow in a nonuse or nonconsumptive use reserve to satisfy the natural flow rights of riparian
proprietors. 5 4 This is a very vital aspect of water law for it concerns
artificial uses and needs, especially for those enterprises not contiguous to streams but dependent thereon for water supplies. The use
of the surplus stream flow has been a very important factor in the
growth of the West. The doctrine of prior appropriation has played
52. 3 KENT Com. 354, 355 (1828) noting comment at footnote, p. 439; Wiel,
op. cit. (footnote 19), pp. 251-254; INsT. JusT. Lib. 2, sec. 1; Wiel, op. cit.
(footnote 23) including ch. 41.

53. See, for example, Omelvany v. Jaggers, supra, Embrey v. Owen, 6 Ex.
353 (1851) and White v. Whitney Mfg. Co., supra; PoumN, 3 ILL. L. Rrv. 360,
including footnote 29 thereto; Wiel, op. cit. (footnote 19), pp. 250-251.
54. Tyler v. Wilkinson, supra.
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a significant part as a legal device in reaching that surplus flow to
meet reasonable non-riparian needs.
The riparian principles of Story and Kent did not appear in English decisions, as such, until 1849, though the prior appropriation
doctrine of Blackstone had begun to be rejected much earlier. In the
key case, Wood v. TVaud, the English court drew freely upon the
55
Thus we are adviews of the two American jurists for guidance.
vised that civil law principles were received into the English common
56
The key case
law of surface waters by way of Story and Kent.
has been cited in American courts ever since as authority on riparian
law, though it was distinguished shortly thereafter in respect of
57
diffused surface waters and ground waters.
This paper does not attempt to trace the origin of the English common law of ground waters much beyond the thinking of Lord Coke
and the holding in Acton v. Bludell for they seem to have been the
principal sources of authority until the strict common law rule was
later modified in several of our states by application of the rule of
reasonable use. This modification seems to have started first in New
Hampshire in 1862.58
The case of diffused surface waters appears to be more complex
and confusing but nevertheless important from the standpoint of
conservation, both of water and soil. The law of England apparently
places ownership of these diffused surface waters in the owner of the
land on which they arise. Kent and the French civil law seem to
be the main sources for civil law principles adopted in America. But
the problem involves both the right to use those waters and the right
to pass them or have them passed from higher to lower lands. We
are told that there are considerable dicta in American cases on the
subject of use. In view of the confusion which seems to exist in
the decisions, a specific statement on this subject will be left to later
and special treatment. 59

55. Wood v. Waud, supra; Mason v. Hill, supra; Wiel, op. cit. (footnote
19), pp. 246-247; Hutchins, op. cit. (footnote 5), pp. 38-39.
56. Wiel, op. cit. (footnote 19), pp. 245, 248, 253.
57. Wiel, op. cit. (footnote 27), p. 145; Arkwright v. Gill, 5 M&W 203, 151
Eng. Rep. 87 (1839) ; Acton v. Blundell, supra. Note that the court in Acton
v. Blundell seems to rely upon Roman law in view of the lack of "no direct
authority".
58. Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N. H. 569, 82 Am. Dec. 179 (1862);
Hutchins, op. cit. (footnote 5), p. 158.
59. Hutchins, op. cit. (footnote 5), pp. 111-114; Rawstron v. Taylor, 11 Ex.
369, 156 Eng. Rep. 873 (1855) ; Broadbent v. Ramsbothom, 11 Ex. 602, 156 Eng.
Rep. 971 (1856); 24 MINN. L. Rav. 891-939 (1940); DOMAT, J., THE CIVIL
LAW IN ITS NATURAL ORDm, vol. 1, par. 1583, p. 616, CUSHING ED. (1853).
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ORIGIN Or THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF PRIOR APPROPRIATION

The American system of prior appropriation has been said to have
had its origin in the mining camps of the western States, particularly in California, and in the irrigated areas of Arizona and New
Mexico established originally under the Indian, Spanish and Mexi60
can occupations.
This system recognizes water rights as real property, limited to
a right of use until the water is taken into possession when it becomes, in most States, personal property. In this general respect
of the rights of use, the prior appropriation and common law systems for watercourses are very much alike. They are also alike in
that the rule of reasonable use applies, though its underlying basis
differs in the two systems, the appropriation system placing greater
emphasis upon the beneficial nature of the use and the common law
system placing greater emphasis upon the claims to water rights of
all other riparian proprietors. In California, where the distinction
formerly prevailed, the two doctrines are now exactly alike in this
respect.6 1
There is some disagreement among students as to the origin of
our Western custom of appropriating water. One view is that it
came from the Indian, Spanish and Mexican occupations. Another
view is that it was born of necessity in the California gold mining
camps. The weight of opinion seems to favor the latter in view of
the specific procedure which these customs left to us and which
have been followed in many western States. It is clear that the
mining customs which recognized property rights by reason of discovery and development, as the basis for establishment and continuance of title, have had an important bearing upon the adoption of the
doctrine of prior appropriation since the latter depends upon the
taking of possession of water and putting it to beneficial use within a
reasonable time as the basis for establishment and continuance of
title. Both in the case of irrigation and in the case of mining, the
use of land and the use of water are very closely associated for one
without the other has limited value. Water is generally considered
appurtenant to the land, though not inseparably so.62
60. YALE, MINING CLAIMS AND WATER RIGHTS (1869); LINDLEY ON MINES,
3d ed., §§ 40-49 (1914); COLBY, W. E., 4 CALIF. L. Rsv., 437-452 (1916);
Ricketts, op. cit. (footnote 29) ; Hutchins, op. cit. (footnote 5), pp. 27-29, 64-69;
Report to Governor of Kansas, op. cit. (footnote 16), p. 21; COLBY, 33 CALIF.
L. RV. 371 (1945); U. S. v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., supra, together with
footnote on historical background of water doctrine.
61. Wiel, op. cit. (footnote 23), p. 20; Hutchins, op. cit. (footnote 5), pp.
28-29; Report, Water Resources Law, op. cit. (footnote 6), pp. 175-178.
62. Ricketts, op. cit. (footnote 29), p. xxiii; Hutchins, op. cit. (footnote 5),
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INFLUENCE OF THE INDIAN, SPANISH AND MEXICAN OCCUPATIONS:

IRRIGATION

Prior to the American occupation of the West, this vast area was
under the control of Indian tribes and subsequently, the French,
Spanish, Mexican, and British Governments. The area involved
in the Louisiana Purchase was acquired from France in 1803, a year
before the Code Napoleon was promulgated in France and nine years
before it was adopted in Louisiana. Mexico gained her independence
from Spain in 1821 and Texas, her independence from Mexico in
1836. California and adjacent territory, which later became part of
Arizona, were acquired from Mexico in 1848 and 1853. The Northwest Territory was acquired from England during the same general
period. These changes in jurisdiction took place shortly before or
shortly after the decisive water rulings in England. Thus, except
for the State of Texas and scattered localities held in private ownership and recognized as such, the entire West became public domain
under the control of the Federal Government. This has profoundly
affected all Western water law and programs. It contrasts sharply
with the situation in the eastern States, though the original thirteen
states ceded to the Federal Government much of their lands lying
toward the Mississippi River. In turn, the Federal Government
granted large areas of wet lands to the newly formed states east of
the Mississippi but west of the original states. Later the Government granted vast acreages of both wet and dry lands beyond the
Mississippi to private individuals, transportation companies, and the
states which were formed out of the public domain. In the Great
Plains almost all of the public domain passed into private ownership
but in the Intermountain Plateau country, most of the land remained
63
public domain.
It appears that there were local Indian water customs in effect
in this territory, especially in the States of Arizona and New Mexico.
Water was diverted from streams for irrigation of alluvial valleys
without regard to whether or not lands were contiguous to the
streams. Diffused surface waters were caught and distributed by
64
But it is
crude rock-spreading devices over sloping mesa lands.
not clearly evident as to the extent to which Indian customs of water
pp. 67, 385; U. S. v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., supra. See, especially, CoLBY,

OF THE MINER AND ITS INFLUENcE ON WATER LAW IN LEGAL
THE F uDO
ESSAYS IN TRIBUTE TO ORRIN Kip McMInURRAY (1935).
63. Colby, op. cit. (footnote 55), p. 370; COLBY, 36 CALIF. L. RPy. 355-389
(1949); COLBY, JouR. Ot MINES AND GEoL, vol. 46, No. 4, pp. 483-508 (Octo-

ber, 1950).
64. Personal observations of relic and other works near Mesa and Safford,
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use found their way into and were specifically sanctioned by law,
except for those affecting community irrigation systems known as
acequias under Spanish and Mexican rule. These were and still
are protected and recognized by later occupation authorities.6 5
The Spanish and Mexican occupations brought water customs to
the West, especially the Southwest, and continued to recognize some
of the Indian customs. These customs not only concerned rights
to water by reason of diversion and use under a policy of appropriation but extended to the formation of group water organizations.66
There were also grants of water rights by the governments along
with grants of lands, especially for towns known then as pueblos.
The rights of these pueblos have been protected and extended by
American law.67
INVLUENCE 019 THE EAIY UITD
STATES OCCUPATION:
MINING AND IRRIGATION

In 1847 the Mormon colonists reached Salt Lake Valley and started
the practice of cropland irrigation during that year through direct
diversion from streams. The next year gold was discovered in California. These two new developments attracted settlers, miners and
fortune seekers from all over the world. We are told that the
miners brought with them customs from other mining areas. 68
The gold and water were part of the public domain for the most
Arizona and Taos, New Mexico; Clough v. Wing, 2 Ariz. 371, 380, 17 Pac.
451, 455-456 (1888) ; Hagerman Irr. Co. v. McMurray, 16 N. M. 172, 113 Pac.
823 (1911) ; SoILs AND MrN, Yearbook of Agriculture, USDA, p. 693 (1938) ;
Hutchins, op. cit. (footnote 5), pp. 66-67; Report, Water Resources Law, op. cit.
(footnote 6), p. 175. See also existing community system of irrigation at Isleta,
New Mexico.
65. HUTcHINs, WErLS A., THR Co
uNITy AcEQuIA: ITS ORIGIN AND DsVELOPMENT, SouTHwsTERN HISTORIA L QUARTERLY, VOI. XXXI, No. 3, pp.
261-272 (Jan., 1928) with references therein- See also Act of Congress, March
3, 1851, 9 STAT. 631. No attempt is here made to consider recognition of Indian
water rights on reservations.
66. U. S. v. Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Co., 9 N. M. 292, 51 Pac. 674 (1898);
Boquillas Land & Cattle Co. v. St. David Coop. Comm. & Devel. Assoc., 11
Ariz. 128, 89 Pac. 505 (1907) ; Maricopa County N. IV. C. Dist. v. Southwest
Cotton Co., 39 Ariz. 65, 4 Pac. (2d) 369 (1931) ; Tatterfield v. Putnam, 45
Ariz. 156, 41 Pac. (2d) 228 (1935) ; Hutchins, op. cit. (footnote 60), pp. 263272; U. S. v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., .spra.
67. Felix v. Los Angeles, 58 Calif. 73, 79-80 (1881); Lux v. Haggin, 69
Calif. 255, 328-331, 4 Pac. 919 (1884) ; Vernon Irr. Co. v. Los Angeles, 106
Calif. 237, 250-251 (1895) ; Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 124 Calif. 597, 639-640, 57
Pac. 585 (1899); Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Farm. & Mill. Co., 152 Calif.
645, 650-653, 93 Pac. 869, 1135 (1908) ; Los Angeles v. Hunter, 156 Calif. 603,
608-609, 105 Pac. 755 (1909); San Diego v. Cuyamaca Water Co., 209 Calif.
105, 116-132, 152-165, 287 Pac. 475, 287 Pac. 496 (1930).
68. Colby, op. cit. (footnote 55), p. 370; Report, Water Resources Law, op.
cit. (footnote 6), p. 177; MgAp, IRIGATION INSTITUTIoNS, pp. 42-48.
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part. Placer mining and irrigation required enormous quantities of
water. These were artificial uses and required diversion and conveyance of water to lands not contiguous to the streams.
At that time there were no water or mining laws applicable to the
public domain because Congress had not legislated on the matter.
Other foreign laws were not considered applicable to the new developments. In these circumstances the miners were technical trespassers and the gold and water are said to have belonged to the
government. Competition over mining claims and water supplies
brought on serious conflicts. Rules of conduct had to be developed
to reduce bloodshed and facilitate work. Here is where the "custom
of the diggins" is said to have originated in which priority of discovery and diligent prosecution of development of claims became the
custom and policy. The system of holding local meetings, formation
of mining districts, and recording of claims, together with development of rules of conduct, are said to have led to the establishment of
the doctrine of prior appropriation and beneficial use of water, and
the administration of water rights, first on a county and later on
a statewide basis.

69

From 1848 to 1850, when California was admitted to the Union,
there were no territorial water laws in that area. Upon its admission, the new state adopted the common law of England as the rule
of decision. In 1851 the legislature adopted the Civil Practices Act
recognizing the custom of the miners as local rule of law. These
recognized customs continued in effect in technical conflict with the
adopted common law principles for many years. This presented the
courts with new problems for here were two opposing systems of
water law, one growing out of custom and the other being borrowed
from other jurisdictions. 70 This did not reach decisive issue, however, until 1886.71

As each succeeding state on the Pacific Coast and in the Great
Plains was admitted to the Union, it adopted the English common
law as the rule of decision. The courts of these states and California
held this to have included the common law of watercourses. But
states formed in the Intermountain Plateau region, where water
shortage conditions have always been extremely critical and the land
69. Colby, op. cit. (footnote 55), pp. 370-371; Ricketts, op. cit. (footnote 29);
Hutchins, op. cit. (footnote 5), p. 67.
70. CALV. Civir PRACTICE ACT, April 29, 1851, § 621, now § 748, CoDE
CIVIL PROCEDURES;

Colby, op. cit. (footnote 55), pp. 370-371; U. S. v. Gerlach

Live Stock Co., supra.
71. Lux v. Haggin, 69 Calif. 255, 10 Pac. 674 (1886). See summary of this
and subsequent cases reported by Hutchins, op. cit. (footnote 50), pp. 45-48
and U. S. v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., suipra.
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is primarily in Federal ownership, never did adopt the common law
of watercourses or completely abrogate it as entirely inapplicable.' 2
This decision accorded with practical considerations and seems to
have been a very sound one.
These two broad approaches to the establishment of a system of
water rights resulted in two different concepts of the derivation of
title, one called the California doctrine (dual system of riparian and
appropriative rights) and the other called the Colorado doctrine (the
single appropriative rights system).73
The California concept rested on the theory of the right to appropriate water upon the public domain derived from the United States
as owner, first by implication and later through confirmation by Congress. The Colorado concept rested upon the theory that these
rights derived from the public ownership of the waters by the people
of the states involved in which the United States had no greater
proprietary capacity than a private landowner and particularly because the common law of watercourses was wholly unsuited to the
semi-arid conditions. In other words, the California concept started
with a Federal title from which riparian rights are deduced while
the Colorado concept started with a rejection of riparian rights from
which rejection of Federal title follows. 74 It would seem that if one
recognizes, as Congress and the western States did, the custom of
prior appropriation as suited to the West, then the existence of the
riparian doctrine is thereby negatived and the common law so modified; for, the two doctrines" of water law are directly in opposition
in respect of water use and its relationship to the land.
In 1866 and 1870 Congress acted to recognize and confirm the
customs of prior appropriation by suitable legislation. This was
followed by other important legislation which strengthened water
rights customs as having sanction of law and also encouraged the development of water. These legislative pronouncements have been
interpreted as having constituted recognition of pre-existing rights
of possession and to have severed the water from the land in the
public domain. 75 The right of the states to adopt whatever systems
of water rights law they choose, so long as these do not violate con72.
73.
p. 31.
74.
75.

Hutchins, op. cit. (footnote 5), pp. 30-31, 38-39.
Wiel, op. cit. (footnote 23), pp. 173-228; Hutchins, op. cit. (footnote 5),

Hutchins, op. cit. (footnote 5), p. 31.
Hutchins, op. cit. (footnote 5), pp. 36, 70-73;

RI.PoRT, PREsERVATIO,

OF

INTGRITY OF STATE WATER LAWS, NAT. RECL. Assoc., pp. 49-54 (1943);

Colby, op. cit. (footnote 55), pp. 371-374; U. S. v. Gerlach Live Stock Co.,
supra.
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stitutional provisions was also upheld.78
Other western States as well as California recognized prior appropriation customs and also adopted statutes providing for state-wide
77
administration, except in Montana where the county basis still exists.
A few states adopted the strict English common law for ground
waters, some the doctrine of correlative rights, and others the appropriation doctrine. But the extent of adoption in each case varies
with respect to well defined subterranean channels and percolating
waters. 78 A decision of the Arizona Supreme Court rendered in
January, 1952, purported to adopt the appropriation doctrine for percolating ground waters. 79 However, a rehearing has been granted
and the decision thereon is still pending.
Determinations with respect to diffused surface waters in the West
have been made mainly by the courts. It seems that the owner of
the land on which they arise may make reasonable use of these waters
but this is not an absolute right, as it appears to be in England, for
downstream interests are involved. These interests have rights to
stream flow which originates, in part at least, upon watershed lands.80
In addition, the so-called California-doctrine States further modified the riparian doctrine. These changes are briefly summarized
hereafter because of their bearing upon problems involved in shifting from a riparian system to a dual system and finally to the appropriation system in large part. Since this seems to be a broad but
slowly developing trend, it may have implications for some of the
eastern States as their population, industry and agriculture expand
to anticipated levels, and as competition for water becomes more acute.
EXT4USION OV THE SYSTEM OV PRIOR APPROPRIATION AND
RESTRICTION OF THE COMMON LAW SYSTEM IN THE WEST

The adoption of the two divergent systems of water rights by the
different groups of states, above referred to, did not settle the problems of Western water development and use, by any means. The
two systems did open the way for and aided materially the establishment of title to waters, as the vast majority of cases indicates.
The major problems of reconciling conflicting uses and balancing
supply of and demand for water presented difficult issues for the
76. Hutchins, op. cit. (footnote 5), p. 34 with cases cited in footnote 33
thereto.
77. Wiel, op. cit. (footnote 23), pp. 177-180; Hutchins, op. cit. (footnote 5),
pp. 31, 68, 74-107.
78. Hutchins, op. cit. (footnote 5), pp. 147-151; Part III, 182-264.
79. Bristor v. Cheatham, sra.
80. Hutchins, op. cit. (footnote 5), pp. 110-145.
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courts and the legislatures. Whereas, in the beginning of the United
States occupation, mining in upstream areas was the dominant enterprise in many watersheds, use for production of hay and crops
of all kinds in the valleys below became increasingly important with
industrial expansion and the consequent need for food and fiber.
These aspects were also reflected in increased use of water by municipalities. 8 '
With the needs for water outrunning the supply in recent years,
the question of conservation seems to have been emphasized more
than the question of establishment of title to waters. As a result,
the decisions reflect greater emphasis upon the rule of reasonable
beneficial use. But the judicial standard of what constitutes reasonable beneficial use for irrigation seems to have lagged far behind
that of the better scientific practices now being carried out in soil
conservation districts. As these practices become more widely accepted in local areas, it is to be hoped that the courts will thereby find
an adequate basis for emphasizing judicial standards more nearly
approaching scientific standards.
The influence of and changes which took place in the two systems
of law may be seen by review of decisions in a few of the states which
made up the two broad groups. Though their divergent concepts were
very important when originally developed, there now seems to be a
tendency among all western States for gradually developing one broad
theory of water law directed toward development and beneficial use.82
INFLUENCE OF AND CHANGES WHICH DEVELOPED IN THE
CALIFORNIA CONCEPT O

WATER

RIGHTS

The practice of hydraulic gold mining caused so much damage to
lower lying areas that it was nearly put out of business after the
famous Debris cases. But the canals which had supplied water for
this activity and then ceased to be used for some time were later found
to be suitable in providing water for irrigation and power purposes.
The mining, irrigation, power and municipal uses were often appropriative in nature but not entirely so; for, some were considered
riparian uses. These and the lower valley uses, which had become
established during and shortly after the Debris cases, later came into
conflict. 83 Subsequently there were conflicts between the irrigation,
84
power and municipal uses.
81. Wiel, op. cit. (footnote 3), p. 253.
82. Hutchins, op. cit. (footnote 5), pp. 78-80. Note: Most western States
have dedicated unappropriated waters of the state to public purposes.

83. Wiel, op. cit. (footnote 3), pp. 254, 260, 266, 268.
84. See cases op. cit. (footnote 62); Holt v. Cheyenne, 22 Wyo. 212, 137 Pac.
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The first decision in California in a major controversy between
claimants of riparian rights on the one hand and of appropriative
rights on the other came in 1886.85 This upheld the riparian rights
of the landowners using flood waters for private meadow lands as
against prior appropriators using water for irrigation. This decision
in effect seems to have confined prior appropriation to public lands
and recognized common law rights for private lands. Here is where
the customs of the miners recognized by Congress and the legislature came up against the common law adopted when the state was
admitted to the Union. The ruling in this case profoundly influenced
California water law, and its effect is said to have spread to other
California-doctrine States. 6
The dominant position of riparian rights, requiring the maintenance of the natural flow of streams, became so restrictive of development of surplus stream flow that, following upon its reaffirmation in a subsequent major decision in 1926, and in spite of the
possibility of alternative physical and financial solutions which might
have been accepted by the court,8 7 the state turned to constitutional
amendment. All this harks back to the adoption of the English common law as rule of decision. 88
The amendment adopted in 1928 not only limited riparian rights
to reasonable use by reasonable methods of diversion but affected all
other water rights too. 89 It was subsequently upheld as not subject
to attack under the Federal Constitution. 90 And though injunction
no longer lies in such situations, the right remains fully compensable. 9 1
Generally speaking, the amendment seems to have restricted riparian
as well as other rights in such a way as to open up for development
and use by appropriative and other means a considerable portion of
the surplus reserves of stream flow and of ground water basins too.
876 (1914) ; Meridian v. San Francisco, 13 Calif. (2d) 424, 90 Pac. (2d) 537

(1939); Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193, 96 Pac. (2d) 836 (1939); Beus v.
Soda Springs, 62 Idaho 1, 107 Pac. (2d) 151 (1940).
85. Lux v. Haggin, 69 Calif. 255, 10 Pac. 674 (1886); Wiel, op. cit. (footnote 3), pp. 256-259; Hutchins, op. cit. (footnote 5), p. 45.

86. Wiel, op. cit. (footnote 3), p. 259.
87. Herminghaus v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 200 Calif. 81, 252 Pac. 607

(1926) ; Wiel, op. cit. (footnote 3), pp. 268, 269, 274; Hutchins, op. cit. (foot-

note 5), p. 45. Note: This ruling included all annual flood flows as natural
flows.
88. SHAW, LuCIEN, THz DEVELOPIENT 01' THn LAW OF WATERS IN THE
WSt, 10 CALIr. L. Rav. 443, 455; 189 Calif. 779, 791.
89. CALIF. CONST., Art. XIV, § 3; Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Calif. (2d)
351, 366, 40 Pac. (2d) 486, 490 (1935) ; Wiel, op. cit. (footnote 3), pp. 274-294;
Hutchins, op. cit. (footnote 5), p. 45..

90. Peabody v. Vallejo, supra; Hutchins, op. cit. (footnote 5), p. 45 with
footnote citations.
91. U. S.

v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., supra.
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However, it left riparian and overlying rights (served by ground
water) in a dominant position but not to the extent which previously
92
existed.
The developments in ground water law, aside from that already
indicated, seem to have paralleled the developments in the law of
watercourses to some extent at least. Following adoption of the
common law as rule of decision, the courts established in 1871 the
rule of absolute ownership. 93 This was replaced in 1903 by the rule
of correlative rights, one effect of which was to protect.local users
from exportations of water to distant points of use. Surface waters
and ground waters were recognized as one source of supply where
they were shown to be interconnected. 94 But exportation was later
permitted for surplus waters. 9 5 It was also held that rights in
ground waters may be acquired by prescription though the landowner; upon timely action, may have a declaratory decree to protect
his right.9 6 Recently the rule of prescription has been extended to
97
the new concept of mutual prescription.
INFUIIENCE OF AND CHANGES WHICH TOOK PLACE IN OREGON*

As in California, the existence of the riparian law was acknowledged early by the Oregon courts. 98 But the use of water for irrigation was permitted along with the domestic and livestock uses
originally allowed. 99 These rights were held to attach upon acquisition of title to public domain. 10 0 But such rights could be lost by
prescription. 101
However, this common law trend of decisions was early affected
by the Congressional acts, previously referred-to, recognizing rights
of appropriation on public domain. 10 2 This legislation was construed
92 Meridian v. San Francisco, supra; Hutchins, op. cit. (footnote 5), pp.

45-46; Report, Water Resources Law, op. cit. (footnote 6), p. 717.

93. Hanson v. McCue, 42 Calif. 303, 10 Am. RLP. 299 (1871); Hutchins,
op. cit. (footnote 5), p. 159.
94. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Calif. 116, 128-137, 70 Pac. 663 (1902), 74
Pac. 766 (1903).
95. Burr v. Maclay Rancho Water Co., 154 Calif. 428, 98 Pac. 260 (1908).
96. Hutchins, op. cit. (footnote 5), p. 160.
97. Pasedena v. Alhambra, 33 Calif. (2d) 903, 925-926, 928-933, 207 Pac.
(2d) 17 (1949).

.Note:
The following material on Oregon and Kansas is based largely upon a recent
summary, not as yet published, prepared for the writer by Wells A. Hutchins.

98. Taylor v. Welch, 6 Oreg. 198, 200 (1876).
99. Coffman v. Robbins, 8 Oreg. 278, 282 (1880).
100. Norwood v. Eastern Oregon Land Co., 112 Oreg. 106, 111, 227 Pac. 1111
(1924) ; Faull v. Cooke, 19 Oreg. 455, 464, 26 Pac. 662 (1890).
101. Norwood v. Eastern Oregon Land Co., supra.
102. 14 STAT. L. 353, § 9; U. S. R.v. STATS., § 2339 (July 26, 1866);
15 STAT. 218; U. S. Rxv. STAT., § 2340 (July 9, 1870).
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by the Oregon Supreme Court to permit appropriation of waters on
the public domain as against the common law -rule regarding continuous natural flow.1a 3 The Court indicated that riparian and appropriative rights could exist in the same locality, 1° 4 but almost at the same
time indicated that these rights were incompatible.' 0 5 The court began to encounter difficulties, however, after recognizing and then
attempting to apportion water among riparian proprietors.10 6
The court also developed another approach to the problem by holding that a water user must elect to stand on a riparian or an appropriative right.107 And once one or the other is elected, the user
thereby waives the other alternative.10 8 This attempt at reconciling
the two opposing theories of water rights seems to have had considerable effect upon the water law of Oregon.
About this time the court had occasion to interpret the Desert
Land Act of 1877,109 together with the related acts of 1866 and 1870,
to permit appropriation upon the public domain of surplus waters of
non-navigable streams, subject to established rights; and to thereby
abrogate the common law doctrine, except for domestic uses.110 This
was upheld by the U. S. Supreme Court. 1
Then in 1909 the "Water Code" further limited vested riparian
rights to the extent of actual application of water to beneficial use
prior to the passage of the statute or actual application to beneficial use
within a reasonable time thereafter by means of works then under
construction. In either case the limitation applied to situations which
existed prior to the statute. It thereby cut off future uses which had
not been initiated prior to the establishment of the new policy. It
also provided an exclusive procedure for the adjudication of these
rights.1 12 This code, including the new definitions contained therein,
103. Hough v. Porter, 51 Oreg. 318, 383-386, 95 Pac. 732 (1908); 98 Pac.
1083 (1909); 102 Pac. 728 (1909).
104. Williams v. Atnow, 51 Oreg. 275, 300, 95 Pac. 200, 97 Pac. 539 (1908).
105. In re Sucker Creek, 83 Oreg. 228, 234, 163 Pac. 430 (1917).
106. Jones v. Conn, 39 Oreg. 30, 37, 46, 64 Pac. 855, 65 Pac. 1068 (1901);
Hough v. Porter, mtpra; Caviness v. La Grande Irr. Co., 60 Oreg. 410, 421-422,

119 Pac. 731 (1911) ; In re Sucker Creek, supra.

107. Low v. Schaffer, 24 Oreg. 239, 246, 33 Pac. 678 (1893); Williams v.

Altnow, mtpra; State ex rel. Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Davis, 116 Oreg. 232,

236, 240 Pac. 882 (1925).
108. Davis v. Chamberlain, 51 Oreg. 304, 311, 98 Pac. 154 (1908) ; In re

Sucker Creek, supra.

109. 19 STAT. L. 377 (March 3, 1877).

110. Hough v. Porter, supra.

111. California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U. S.
142, 160-163 (1935); Hedges v. Riddle, 63 Oreg. 257, 259-260, 127 Pac. 548
(1912).

112. O.,ox LAWS 1909, ch. 216; OREG. Coup. LAWs ANN., §§ 116-40,
116-402 (1940).
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was upheld by the Oregon Supreme Court as proper under the police
power of the state.1 13 It was also upheld in the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals." 4 The decree was affirmed by the U. S. Supreme
Court but upon somewhat different grounds." 5
Throughthe foregoing and other processes, it is clear that in Oregon the effect of court decisions and acts of the legislature was to
reduce progressively the effectiveness of the common law doctrine
and to increase the effectiveness of the doctrine of prior appropriation.
This appears to have come about by reason of necessity. As a consequence the old doctrine has been reduced to the point where it has
ceased to be of much importance.
CHANGES IN KANSAS

The changes which took place in Kansas were quite similar to those
in Oregon but much more abrupt and this in very recent years. The
common law doctrine was held to apply here by reason of adoption
16
of the English common law when Kansas was still a territory.'
Modification of the strict riparian principles was permitted, however.117 It was upheld as late as 1944 as against an appropriator
attempting to acquire water rights under the statutory procedure." 8
And even in 1949, prior to the interpretation of the new 1945 statute,
the court discussed these same principles." 9 It should be kept in
mind, in these connections, as indicated previously, that the Great
Plains states, though originally public domain, were rapidly taken up
as homesteads and state school sections or railroad lands. Thus,
whereas in the far West much land remained and still is part of the
public domain, this situation has not obtained in Kansas.
Faced with this limitation on the development and beneficial use
of water, the legislature adopted a new appropriation statute after
others had been found to be ineffective. 12 0 This new act strengthened
113. In re Willow Creek, 740 Oreg. 592, 610-620, 627-628, 144 Pac. 505
(1914), 146 Pac. 475 (1915); In re Hood River, 114 Oreg. 112, 173-182, 227
Pac. 1065 (1924).
114. California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 73 Fed.
(2d) 555 (C.C.A. 9th, 1934).
115. California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., supra.
116. Shamleffer v. Council Grove Peerless Mill Co., 18 Kans. 24, 31-33
(1877); Frizell v. Bindley, 144 Kans. 84, 91-92, 58 Pac. (2d) 95 (1936).
117. Emporia v. Soden, 25 Kans. 588, 606 (1881).
118. State ex rel. Peterson v. State Board of Agriculture, 158 Kans. 603,
605, 149 Pac. (2d) 604 (1944).
119. Heise v.Schulz, 167 Kans. 34, 41-43, 204 Pac. (2d) 706 (1949).
120. KANS. LAWS 1886, ch. 115; KANS. LAWS 1941, ch. 261; KINS. LAWS
1917, ch. 172. See State ex rel. Peterson v. State Board of Agriculture, supra;
KAS. LAWS 1945, ch. 390, GEN. STATS. 1949, §§ 82a-701 to 82a-722. See also
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the appropriation doctrine and reduced the advantage of the location
of lands contiguous to streams. The experience in Oregon and Nebraska was drawn upon heavily in accomplishing this task. This
21
statute was upheld by the Kansas Supreme Court.
Kansas appears to have adopted the strict common law rule in respect to ground water but later modified this. 12 2 As late as 1944, it
was held to prevent appropriation of ground waters under the statute.128 This situation was shortly thereafter cured by the new ap24
propriation statute.'
INLUENCE OP AND CHANGES WHICH DEVELOPED IN THE
COLORADO CONCEPT OP IWATER RIGHTS

In 1872 the Territorial Supreme Court of Colorado enlarged the
concept of prior appropriation to cover waters upon all lands in the

area, public or private. 125 This was reiterated in 1882 by the State
Supreme Court, after statehood was attained in 1876.126 This trend
seems to have spread among the other states in this group. In view
of the rather uniform approach for running streams adopted by this
group of states, only a brief statement will be made in respect of
ground waters for three representative states, because changes are
27
well summarized elsewhere.'
In Utah all waters, both above and under the ground, are declared
to be public waters available for appropriation, subject to existing
rights. The appropriation doctrine has existed from the beginning,
though the common law doctrine was not declared to be repudiated
until 1891. The statutory method is the exclusive method by which
the appropriation of water is now made. 128
The situation in Arizona has been similar to other Colorado doctrine states except for percolating ground waters.' These were conReport to Governor of Kansas, op. cit. (footnote 16), p. 79, prepared in connection with development of recommendations to the state legislature for the

1945 statute.
121. State ex rel. Emery v. Knapp, 167 Kans. 546, 555-556, 207 Pac. (2d)
440 (1949) ; Report to Governor of Kansas, op. cit. (footnote 16), pp. 25-31.
122. Emporia v. Soden, mipra; Jobling v. Tuttle, 75 Kans. 351, 360, 89 Pac.
699 (1907);

(1911).

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Gilmore v. Royal Salt Co., 84 Kans. 729, 731, 115 Pac. 541

State ex rel. Peterson v. State Board of Agriculture, supra.
KANs. LAws 1945, ch. 390; GtN. STATs. Supp. 1947, ch. 82a, art. 7.
Yunker v. Nichols, 1 Colo. 551 (1872).
Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
Wiel, op. cit. (footnote 3), p. 258; Hutchins, op. cit. (footnote 5), pp.

74-107.

128. See Water Resources Law, Appendix B, op. cit. (footnote 6), pp. 766-

770 (1950).
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sidered the property of land owners in 1906.129 This year, 1952,
the Arizona Supreme Court stated that the appropriation doctrine
applies to these as well as other ground waters.130 However, a rehearing has been granted and decision thereon is pending.
In New Mexico, the common law of riparian rights was early held
not to be in force and the appropriation doctrine was held to have
existed by custom, judicial decision and 'necessity.1 3 1 This state
pioneered in ground water control and its history is important from
132
constitutional and administrative standpoints.

129. Howard v. Perrin, 8 Ariz. 347, 353-354, 76 Pac. 460 (1904); Howard v.
Perrin, 200 U. S. 71 (1906).
130. Bristor v. Cheattam, supra.
131. Trambley v. Luterman, 6 N. Mex. 15, 25, 27 Pac. 312 (1891) ; U. S. v.
Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Co., 9 N. Mex. 292, 306, 51 Pac. 674 (1898); Albuquerque Land & Irr. Co. v. Gutierrez, 10 N. Mex. 177, 236-237, 61 Pac. 357
(1900) ; Snow v. Abalos, 18 N. Mex. 681, 693, 140 Pac. 1044 (1914).
132. See, Water Resources Law, Appendix B, op. cit. (footnote 6), pp. 744749.
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